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Abstract
Optimal shelflisting invites profit maximization to become sensitive to the ways in which purchasing decisions are
order-dependent. We study the computational complexity of the corresponding product arrangement problem when
consumers are either rational maximizers, use a satisficing procedure, or apply successive choice. The complexity
results we report are shown to crucially depend on the size of the top cycle in consumers’ preferences over products
and on the direction in which alternatives on the shelf are encountered.
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1. Introduction
There are at least two main research directions in recent works in economics devoted to the study of order or
frame effects on consumers’ behavior. The first one adopts a choice theoretic approach and provides foundations for
encompassing non-standard behavior models (cf. Masatlioglu and Ok, 2005; Rubinstein and Salant, 2006; Salant and
Rubinstein, 2008; Bernheim and Rangel, 2009), while the second direction incorporates frames as part of players’
strategy spaces and analyzes the structure of the corresponding market equilibrium outcomes (cf. Eliaz and Spiegler,
2011; Spiegler, 2014). A complementary viewpoint is provided by experimental studies in the marketing literature
(cf. Valenzuela and Raghubir, 2009; Valenzuela et al., 2013) with the focus being on consumers’ beliefs about the
organization of product displays and their impact on position-based consumers’ preferences over products as well as
on retailers’ actual shelflistings.
Our starting point in the present paper is that of a single shelf designer who has to arrange a given number of
products on a shelf in a way that maximizes his profit. In doing so, he is facing a finite set of consumers who select
a single product from the shelf by using a pre-specified choice rule. However, in sharp contrast to the cited works,
we analyze the effects of consumers’ behavior on the optimal shelf listing from a computational complexity perspec-
tive.1 For this, we set the shelf designer’s product arrangement problem (denoted by PA) and study its computational
complexity when consumers are either rational maximizers, follow a satisficing procedure for choosing from lists, or
apply successive choice when purchasing their products (see Section 2 for the corresponding definitions).
We show that this decision problem is computationally easy when consumers are rational (Theorem 1), while
turning to be in general more difficult when they use a satisficing choice rule (Theorems 2 and 3) as then to become
hard for the case of successive choice (Theorems 4-7). The term “in general” stands as to indicate the sensibility of
our results with respect to the following features of the decision problem. First, we allow a consumer to encounter
the products on the shelf either from left to right or from right to left (the product arrangement problem when all
consumers check the list in the same direction (from left to right) is denoted by SE-PA). Second, in the case of
successive choice, allowing for non-transitive consumer preferences makes our results dependent on the size of the
corresponding top cycles, that is, on the number of consumers’ top favorite products. This dependence is summarized
in Table 1.
Our focus on the three types of consumers’ behavior is partially in line with the corresponding findings in Salant
(2011) with respect to their state complexity. Since the problem we study is from the viewpoint of a shelf designer
1We will assume familiarity with basic concepts in computational complexity: exponential time, polynomial time, polynomial-time reductions,
and NP-hardness.
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Decision Rational Satisficing Successive choice
problem choice choice t = 1 t = 3 t ≥ 4
PA O(m) NP-hard O(nm) NP-hard NP-hard
SE-PA O(m) O(n(log n + m)) O(nm) O(n2m) NP-hard
Table 1: A summary of our results. In the entries corresponding to successive choice, t is the upper bound of the number of top favorite products of
each buyer. Here n is the number of products and m is the number of buyers.
facing various ways of product selection from lists (and we focus on its computational complexity), it is natural to
expect that the corresponding statements go in rather opposite directions. For instance, while the state (or procedural)
complexity of rational choice is much higher than the one of satisficing choice (see Propositions 2 and 3 in Salant,
2011), we show that the PA problem in the latter case is NP-hard, while being polynomial-time solvable in the former
case. The corresponding statement with respect to the successive choice rule also applies. Notice additionally, that
our results do also partially allow for a comparison of the complexity of the SE-PA problem when order effects are
taken into account (that is, when consumers are satisficers or use successive choice). More precisely, as log nn−1 is
smaller than 1 for large values of n, O(n2m) is asymptotically greater than O(n(log n +m)). So, our algorithm to solve
the SE-PA problem when consumers are satisficers is asymptotically faster than the one to solve this problem when
there are at most three top favorite products for each consumer and successive choice is applied.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide the basic definitions with respect to lists,
consumer preferences and the choice functions we consider. Section 3 is then devoted to the problem formulation
and the case when consumers are rational maximizers, while Section 4 contains our results for consumers following
a satisficing procedure for product selection. Section 5 contains then the ways in which the difficulty of a shelf
designer’s task depends on the number of consumers’ top favorite products as well as on the direction in which they
encounter the listed alternatives.
2. Lists, preferences, and choices
Our setup consists of the following basic ingredients.
Products and lists
Let P = {p1, p2, ..., pn} be a set of n products. A list is a permutation of P. We denote by L(P) the set of all n! lists
over P. For convenience, for each list L = (pβ(1), pβ(2), . . . , pβ(n)) ∈ L(P) we refer to pβ(1) as the leftmost product and
to pβ(n) as the rightmost product. Moreover, for each pβ(i) with i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we refer to i as the position of the product
pβ(i) in the list L. Denoting by B = {b1, . . . , bm} the set of m buyers (consumers), we assume that each consumer is
purchasing the product delivered by her pre-specified choice rule from lists.
Preferences
A tournament preference is defined as a complete and asymmetric binary relation  over P. In particular, pi  p j
signifies that pi is preferred to p j. We say that pi is weakly preferred over p j if either pi is preferred to p j or pi = p j.
The top circle of , denoted by TC(), is the unique subset P′ ⊆ P of minimum cardinality such that every product
in P′ is preferred to every product not in P′. For a buyer with tournament preference , products in TC() are called
her top favorite products. The set of all tournament preferences is denoted by T (P). If we require a tournament
preference to be transitive, then we have a linear preference. Clearly, for each linear preference , |TC()| = 1. The
unique element in TC() in this case is referred to as the top product according to . Notice that a linear preference
can be seen as a permutation over P. Precisely, the position of a product p according to  is |p′ ∈ P : p′  p| + 1.
Hence, L(P) is the set of all linear preferences.
Choice functions
We assume that each consumer purchases the product determined by the outcome of her corresponding choice
function. Choice functions from lists were formally introduced in Rubinstein and Salant (2006) (see also Simon, 1955
and Salant, 2003) in order to describe choice behavior potentially affected by the order of the products in a list. We
first describe below the three families of such functions we consider as then to provide a more general description.
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Rational choice ( f RC). Each buyer has a linear preference  ∈ L(P) and chooses her most preferred product accord-
ing to , that is, the one in TC().
Satisficing choice ( f S AT ). Each buyer b has a tournament preference b∈ T (P) and a threshold product p(b) ∈ P.
The buyer chooses the first encountered product from a list that is weakly preferred to her threshold product.
Successive choice
(
f SC
)
. Each buyer has a tournament preference  ∈ T (P) and chooses her product as follows. The
buyer first stores her first encountered product in a register. Then, she goes through the products further and
compares the currently encountered product p j with the one (pi) in the register. If p j  pi, then she replaces pi
by p j in the register and goes forward; otherwise, she goes forward without changing the product in the register.
After the buyer encounters all products, she purchases the product in the register.
Clearly, a rational choice function is independent of any order effects in a list, while the other two choice functions
are sensitive with respect to such order effects. Notice for instance that a consumer b using a satisficing procedure is
more likely to select p(b) when one moves p(b) toward the beginning of a list and thus, primacy effect is displayed.
The magnitude of such a primacy effect crucially depends on the fact whether a consumer starts encountering the
products in a list from the left side to the right side, or she checks the products from the right side to the left side. In
order to pay attention to both ways for encountering the products on a shelf, we will use the following description of
choice functions from lists discussed above.
For each X ∈ {RC, SC}, we define f X : L(P) × P × {1, 0} → P to be a function assigning a single element
f X(L, Pre f , v) ∈ P to every list L = (p1, ..., pn) ∈ L(P), every preference Pre f ∈ P in the corresponding domain (i.e.,
P = L(P) for X = RC andP = T (P) for X = SC), and every v ∈ {1, 0}. The third component v ∈ {1, 0} indicates from
which side the corresponding buyer begins to go through the products in the list L. In particular, “v = 1” means that
the buyer goes through the products from the left side to the right side, and “v = 0” means the buyer goes through the
products from the right side to the left side. We call buyers in the former case left-biased, and buyers in the latter case
right-biased. The choice function f S AT : L(P) × T (P) × {1, 0} × P→ P assigns a single element f S AT (L,, v, p) ∈ P
to every list L, every tournament preference  ∈ T (P), every v ∈ {1, 0} and every p ∈ P. Here, the fourth component
indicates the threshold product of a buyer.
3. Problem formulation and easiest shelflistings
As already indicated in the Introduction, the shelf designer’s problem is to determine a product arrangement
by taking into account consumers’ choice rules. More precisely, we will consider the complexity of the following
problem for each f X with X ∈ {RC, S AT, SC} by letting P = L(P) for X = RC and P = T (P) for X ∈ {S AT, SC}.
Product Arrangement (PA- f X)
Input A set P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} of n products each of which has infinite supplies, a profit function µ : P→ R+, a set
B = {b1, b2, . . . , bm} of m buyers where each bi is associated with a preference Pre fbi ∈ P, an entering function
ω : B→ {0, 1}, and a real number R. For f S AT , each buyer bi ∈ B is associated with a threshold product p(bi).
Question Is there a list L ∈ L(P) such that ∑
bi∈B
µ
(
f X(L, Pre fbi , ω(bi))
)
≥ R
for X ∈ {RC, SC}, and ∑
bi∈B
µ
(
f X(L, Pre fbi , ω(bi), p(bi))
)
≥ R
for X = S AT?
In the above definition, the value ofω(bi) indicates whether bi is left-biased (ω(bi) = 1) or right-biased (ω(bi) = 0).
For each p ∈ P, µ(p) is the profit associated with the product p when sold.
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We will also consider a special case of the above problem where ω(bi) = 1 for all bi ∈ B. We denote this problem
as Single-Enter Product Arrangement (SE-PA- f X). For simplicity, in this case, we dropω(bi) in the above definition.
Notice that buyers using the rational choice function choose their products regardless of how the products are
arranged in a list. This directly leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 1 SE-PA- f RC and PA- f RC are solvable in O(m)-time.
Proof. Since each buyer chooses her most preferred product regardless of how the products are arranged in the list
and from which direction she encounters the products, to solve the problems stated in the theorem we need only to
sum up the profits of the most preferred products of the buyers and compare the sum with R. If the sum is greater
than or equal to R, return “YES”; otherwise, return “NO”. Since we have in total m buyers and it takes O(1) time to
calculate TC() for each linear preference , the algorithm terminates in O(m) time.
4. Biased consumers and satisficing choice
Let us now turn to the situation where consumers use a satisficing procedure for selecting their products from the
shelf. As it turns out, the decision problem is polynomial-time solvable, provided that all consumers are encountering
the alternatives in the same direction (Theorem 2), while becoming NP-hard when both left-biased and right-biased
consumers are allowed (Theorem 3).
Theorem 2 SE-PA- f S AT is solvable in O(n(log n + m)) time.
Proof. We prove the theorem by developing a polynomial-time algorithm of corresponding running time for the
problem stated in the theorem. In what follows, for each buyer b ∈ B, let b and p(b) be the tournament preference
and the threshold product of b, respectively.
The algorithm is quite trivial: sort the products according to the profits, from the highest to the lowest, and
determine if this results in a solution. Formally, let L be a list
(
ppi(1), . . . , ppi(n)
)
such that µ(ppi(x)) ≥ µ(ppi(y)) for every
1 ≤ x < y ≤ n. Then, if ∑b∈B µ ( f S AT (L,b, p(b))) ≥ R, return “YES”; otherwise return “NO”. Such a list L can
be constructed in O(n log n) time by the Merge sort algorithm (cf. Katajainen and Tra¨ff, 1997). In addition, it takes
O(nm) time for all buyers to go through L and choose their products. Calculating the sum of the profits of the chosen
products takes O(m) time. In total, the above algorithm takes O(n(log n+m)) time. It remains to prove the correctness
of the algorithm. For this, the following claim will be useful.
Claim Let L1 =
(
pα(1), . . . , pα(n)
)
be a list, where α is a permutation of {1, 2, . . . , n}, and let, for x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1},
pα(x) and pα(x−1) be two consecutive products with µ(pα(x)) > µ(pα(x−1)). Let L2 be the list obtained from L1 by
swapping pα(x) and pα(x−1). Then, it holds that∑
b∈B
µ
(
f S AT (L2,b, p(b))
)
≥
∑
b∈B
µ
(
f S AT (L1,b, p(b))
)
.
Proof of the Claim. Let b ∈ B be any arbitrary buyer. If there is an x′ with 1 ≤ x′ < x − 1 such that pα(x′) 
p(b) or for every y with 1 ≤ y ≤ x it holds that p(b)  pα(y), then µ
(
f S AT (L1,b, p(b))
)
= µ
(
f S AT (L2,b, p(b))
)
.
Otherwise, either pα(x−1) or pα(x) is the first encountered product that is preferred to p(b), or equivalently, f S AT (L1,b
, p(b)), f S AT (L2,b, p(b)) ∈ {pα(x−1), pα(x)}. If pα(x)  p(b), then f S AT (L2,b, p(b)) = pα(x) and f S AT (L1,b, p(b)) ∈{
pα(x−1), pα(x)
}
; otherwise, f S AT (L2,b, p(b)) = f S AT (L1,b, p(b)) = pα(x−1). Therefore, we have in both cases that
µ
(
f S AT (L2,b, p(b))
)
≥ µ
(
f S AT (L1,b, p(b))
)
. It then directly follows that∑
b∈B
µ
(
f S AT (L2,b, p(b))
)
≥
∑
b∈B
µ
(
f S AT (L1,b, p(b))
)
.
This completes the proof of the claim.
Due to the above claim, if we have a solution L, we can obtain another solution by swapping two consecutive
products in L as indicated in the proof of the claim. By exhaustively performing this swap operation, we can arrive
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at a list
(
ppi(1), . . . , ppi(n)
)
such that µ(ppi(x)) ≥ µ(ppi(y)) for every 1 ≤ x < y ≤ n. The correctness of the algorithm then
follows.
Let us now turn to the study of the PA- f S AT problem for the case where there are both left-biased buyers and
right-biased buyers. In a sharp contrast to the results presented so far, we show that PA- f S AT is NP-hard even when
buyers’ preferences are restricted to be linear. Our proof is by reduction from the following problem.
Restricted Betweenness
Input Two disjoint sets U = {u1, ..., ux}, V = {v1, ..., vy}, an additional element w < U ∪ V , a collection C of 3-tuples
(ui, v j, uk) such that 1 ≤ i , k ≤ x and 1 ≤ j ≤ y, and a collectionD of 3-tuples (vi,w, u j) with 1 ≤ i , j ≤ x.
Question Is there a linear order over U ∪ V ∪ {w} such that for every (a, b, c) ∈ C ∪ D the element b lies between a
and c?
As the above problem has been shown to be NP-hard (cf. Opatrny, 1979), we cannot expect to have an efficient
algorithm to solve the PA- f S AT problem exactly, unless P=NP which is commonly believed to be unlikely.
Theorem 3 PA- f S AT is NP-hard even when all consumers have linear preferences.
Proof. Let I = (U,V,w,C,D) be an instance of the Restricted Betweenness problem. We create first an instance I′
for the problem stated in the theorem.
The products are as follows. For each u ∈ U, we create a product p(u) such that µ(p(u)) = 2. For each v ∈ V , we
create a product p(v) such that µ(p(v)) = 1. In addition, we create for w a product p(w) such that µ(p(w)) = 0. Hence,
the set of products created is P = {p(a) : a ∈ U ∪ V} ∪ {p(w)}.
The buyers are as follows. For each 3-tuple s = (a, b, c) ∈ C ∪ D, we have one left-biased consumer b`s with
threshold product p(b`s) and one right-biased consumer b
r
s with threshold product p(b
r
s). Moreover, each of these two
buyers prefers each of the products in the set {p(a), p(b), p(c)} over her threshold product, while all remaining products
are ordered below it.
According to the above construction, the buyer b`s (resp., b
r
s) corresponding to s = (a, b, c) ∈ C ∪ D chooses
her first encountered product in {p(a), p(b), p(c)}. More precisely, given a list L, the buyer b`s chooses the leftmost
product among {p(a), p(b), p(c)} and the buyer brs chooses the rightmost product among {p(a), p(b), p(c)} from the list
L. Finally, we set the threshold bound R = 4 |C| + 3 |D|.
The construction clearly takes polynomial time. It remains to prove the correctness of the reduction.
(⇒:) Let L′ be a linear order over U ∪ V ∪ {w} such that for every (a, b, c) ∈ C ∪ D the element b is between
a and c. Let L be the list obtained from L′ by replacing every element a of L′ by the corresponding product p(a).
Due to the above discussion, for each s = (ui, v j, uk) ∈ C, the two corresponding buyers b`s and brs choose exactly
the products p(ui) and p(uk), one for each buyer. As µ(p(u)) = 2 for every u ∈ U, the total profit of the products
chosen by all buyers corresponding to 3-tuples in C is exactly 4 |C|. Analogously, for each s = (vi,w, u j) ∈ D, the two
corresponding buyers b`s and b
r
s choose exactly the products p(vi) and p(u j) with u j ∈ U and vi ∈ V . As µ(p(v)) = 1
for every v ∈ V , the total profit of the products chosen by all buyers corresponding to 3-tuples in D is exactly 3 |D|.
Hence, the total profit of the products chosen by all buyers is R = 4 |C| + 3 |D|.
(:⇐) Observe that to achieve the total profit R, every pair of buyers corresponding to a 3-tuple in C must choose
two products whose total profit is at least 4, and every pair of buyers corresponding to a 3-tuple inDmust choose two
products whose total profit is at least 3. Due to above discussion, this happens only if there is a list L such that for
every s = (a, b, c) ∈ C ∪ D the product p(b) is between the products p(a) and p(c). This implies that the linear order
obtained from L by replacing every p(a) with the corresponding element a ∈ U ∪ V ∪ {w} is a solution of I.
5. Top cycles and successive choice
Recall that consumers’ preferences in the definition of the successive choice from lists were not necessarily re-
stricted to be transitive, that is, they may contain cycles. Clearly, since consumers go throughout the products in
the entire list, the existence (and, as it turns out, the size) of top cycles matters. Lemma 1 stated below relates the
consumer’s choice from a list when her corresponding top cycle is of size 3. More precisely, it is always the last
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encountered product from the top favorite products that is selected. We use then Lemma 1 and the construction in the
proof of Theorem 3 in order to show that the product arrangement problem is NP-hard even when each buyer has 3
most favorite products (Theorem 4).
Lemma 1 Let L = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) be a list over P and b ∈ B a buyer with preference . If TC() = {pi, p j, pk} with
i < j < k, then f SC(L,, 1) = pk and f SC(L,, 0) = pi.
Proof. Consider first the situation corresponding to f SC(L,, 1) = pk. Clearly, exactly one product from the set{
pi, p j
}
is preferred to pk. For each x with 1 ≤ x ≤ n, let register(x) be the product in the register immediately after
px has been encountered. Hence, register(1) = p1. We distinguish between the following two cases corresponding to
the two possible preference cycles over the product set {pi, p j, pk}.
Case A (pi  pk). Clearly, it must be then that pk  p j and p j  pi holds. It is easy to check that register( j − 1) = pi,
register( j) = register(k − 1) = p j, and register(k) = register(n) = pk. This implies that f SC(L,, 1) = pk.
Case B (pk  pi). We have now that pi  p j and p j  pk should hold. It follows that register( j − 1) = register( j) =
register(k − 1) = pi and register(k) = register(n) = pk. This again implies that f SC(L,, 1) = pk.
The proof for the situation corresponding to f SC(L,, 0) = pi can be obtained from the above proof by swapping
all occurrences of pi and pk, and replacing all occurrences of 1 by 0.
Theorem 4 PA- f SC is NP-hard, even when each buyer has 3 top favorite products.
Proof. We can utilize the construction used in the proof of Theorem 3 with the following slight difference when
creating the buyers. For each 3-tuple s = (a, b, c) ∈ C ∪ D, we have one left-biased consumer b`s (i.e., ω(b`s) = 1)
and one right-biased consumer brs (i.e., ω(b
r
s) = 0) whose top favorite products are p(a), p(b), and p(c). Clearly, for
each of these buyers, we have either p(a)  p(b)  p(c)  p(a) or p(b)  p(a)  p(c)  p(b) with each of these
three products being preferred to any of the remaining products. The application of Lemma 1 gives us then the same
consumer choices as the ones in the proof of Theorem 3.
Our next lemma states that the outcome of the successive choice rule is always a top favorite product for the
corresponding consumer (the proof is straightforward). It then follows via Lemma 2 that if each buyer has only one
favorite product, then the PA- f SC problem becomes polynomial-time solvable (Theorem 5).
Lemma 2 Let L = (p1, p2, ..., pn) be a list over P and b ∈ B be a buyer with preference . Then, f SC(L,, ω(b)) ∈
TC().
Theorem 5 PA- f SC is solvable in O(nm) time if each buyer has only one top favorite product.
Proof. Due to Lemma 2, each buyer chooses the product in the top circle of her preference no matter how the products
are arranged in the list. Hence, we can directly adopt the algorithm for PA- f RC . However, since it takes O(n) time to
calculate the top circle in this case, the algorithm has running time O(nm).
Consider now SE-PA- f SC , the special case of PA- f SC where there are only left-biased consumers. We first show
that if each buyer has at most 3 top favorite products, then the problem is polynomial-time solvable.
Theorem 6 SE-PA- f SC is solvable in O(n2m) time if |TC(b)| ≤ 3 for every buyer b ∈ B, where b is the preference
of b.
Proof. For P′ ⊆ P, let µmax(P′) = max {µ(p) : p ∈ P′}. Consider the following algorithm: if ∑b∈B µmax(TC(b)) ≥ R,
return “YES”; otherwise return “NO”. We show that the algorithm correctly solves the SE-PA- f SC problem.
Let A be the set of buyers b such that |TC(b)| = 1, and C the set of buyers b such that |TC(b)| = 3. Due to
Lemma 2, every buyer in A chooses the product in TC(b) for every list L over P. So, the total profits from the
products chosen by the buyers in A is
∑
b∈A µ(TC(b)) = ∑b∈A µmax(TC(b)). Let L = (ppi(1), . . . , ppi(n)) be a list such
that µ(ppi(x)) ≤ µ(ppi(y)) for every x and y such that 1 ≤ x < y ≤ n. Consider now a buyer b ∈ C. Without loss
of generality, assume that TC(b) =
{
ppi(x), ppi(y), ppi(z)
}
with x < y < z. Due to Lemma 1, f SC(L,b) = ppi(z) with
µ
(
f SC(L,b)
)
= µmax(TC(b)) following from the definition of L. In summary, the list L results in the highest total
profit that can be achieved, since with respect to L every buyer b chooses a product with a highest profit among all
products that are possible for the buyer to choose. The correctness of the algorithm follows.
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It remains to show the running time of the algorithm. Calculating TC(b) for every b ∈ B can be done in O(n2)
time (cf. Tarjan, 1972 and Sharir, 1981). Since TC(b) is of size at most 3, we can calculate each µmax(TC(b)) in
O(1) time. Summing up them takes O(m) time. Since we have m buyers, the whole running time of the algorithm is
bounded by O(n2m) + O(m) = O(n2m).
We prove now that if we allow each buyer to have one more top favorite product, the problem becomes NP-hard.
The proof utilizes Figures 1-2 and Tables 2-5 which can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 7 SE-PA- f SC is NP-hard even if each buyer has at most 4 top favorite products.
Proof. We prove the theorem by a reduction from the Restricted Betweenness problem. Let I = (U,V,w,C,D) be an
instance of the Restricted Betweenness problem. We create first an instance I′ for the problem stated in the theorem.
The products are as follows. For each u ∈ U, we create a product p(u) such that µ(p(u)) = 31. For each v ∈ V ,
we create a product p(v) such that µ(p(v)) = 32. In addition, we create for w a product p(w) such that µ(p(w)) = 33.
Finally, we create two dummy products d1 and d2 such that µ(d1) = 1 and µ(d2) = 35.
The buyers are as follows. For each 3-tuple s = (ui, v j, uk) ∈ C, we create 4 buyers whose top favorite products
and preferences are as shown in Figure 1. Moreover, for each s = (vi,w, u j) ∈ D, we create 14 buyers whose top
favorite products and preferences are as shown in Figure 2. In total, we have 4 |C| + 14 |D| buyers.
Finally, we set R = 129 |C| + 464 |D|.
The construction clearly takes polynomial time. It remains to prove the correctness of the reduction.
(⇒:) Suppose that I is a YES-instance. Let L′ be a solution of I, and L be the list obtained from L′ by first
replacing every a ∈ L′ by p(a) and then installing d1 and d2 as L’s leftmost and rightmost products, respectively.
Consider now the profit from the products selected by the four buyers created for a (ui, v j, uk) ∈ C. According to the
constructions and Tables 2 and 3, the four buyers choose p(v j), p(uk), p(uk), d2, respectively, if ui L′ v j L′ uk, and
choose p(v j), p(ui), d2, p(ui), respectively, if uk L′ v j L′ ui. Here a L′ b means that a is on the left side of b in L′. In
both cases, the total profit from these products is 32 + 31 + 31 + 35 = 32 + 31 + 35 + 31 = 129. Therefore, the total
profit from the products chosen by buyers corresponding to 3-tuples in C with respect to L is 129 |C|. Consider now a(
vi,w, u j
)
∈ D. According to the construction and Tables 4 and 5, if vi L′ w L′ u j then the 14 buyers corresponding to(
vi,w, u j
)
choose the following products (number of buyers: product):
1 : p(w);
7 : d2;
5 + 1 = 6 : p(u j).
On the other side, if u j L′ w L′ vi then the 14 buyers corresponding to
(
vi,w, u j
)
choose the following products (number
of buyers: product):
1 : p(w);
1 + 7 = 8 : p(vi);
5 : d2.
Notice then that the total profit from these products is 464 and thus, the total profit from the choices of the buyers
corresponding to 3-tuples in D is 464 |D|. Hence, the total profit from the products chosen by all buyers is exactly
equal to R. We conclude then that I′ is a YES-instance.
(:⇐) Suppose that I′ is a YES-instance. Let L be a solution of I′, and L′ be obtained from L by first removing d1
and d2, and then replacing each product p(a) with its corresponding element in U ∪ V ∪ {w}. Observe that according
to the construction, the maximum total profit from the choices by the four buyers corresponding to a
(
ui, v j, uk
)
∈ C is
129. Moreover, this happens if and only if the products in the top circles of the corresponding buyers’ preferences fall
into one of the following cases (see Tables 2 and 3 for further details):
• p(uk) L d1 L p(v j) L p(ui) L d2;
• d1 L p(uk) L p(v j) L p(ui) L d2;
• d1 L p(ui) L p(v j) L p(uk) L d2;
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• p(ui) L d1 L p(v j) L p(uk) L d2.
The key point here is that d2 has to be chosen at least once, since otherwise the total profit from the products chosen
by the four buyers corresponding to a 3-tuple in C can be at most 32 × 4 = 128. Moreover, d1 cannot be chosen by
anyone, since otherwise the total profit from the products chosen by the four buyers corresponding to a 3-tuple in C can
be at most 35×3+1 = 106. So, according to Tables 2 and 3, only the above four cases and
({
p(uk), p(v j)
}
, d1, p(ui), d2
)
satisfy these conditions. However, given
({
p(uk), p(v j)
}
, d1, p(ui), d2
)
, the total profit from the products chosen by the
four buyers corresponding to
(
ui, v j, uk
)
is µ(ui) + µ(uk) + µ(d2) + µ(ui) = 31 + 31 + 35 + 31 = 128 < 129. A further
tedious check shows that all of the above cases lead to the same total profit of 129.
Notice further that the maximal total profit from the choices of the 14 buyers corresponding to a
(
vi,w, u j
)
∈
D is 464. Moreover, a tedious check shows that this happens if and only if the products in the top circles of the
corresponding buyers’ preferences fall into one of the following cases (see Tables 4 and 5 for further details):
• p(u j) L d1 L p(w) L p(vi) L d2;
• d1 L p(u j) L p(w) L p(vi) L d2;
• d1 L p(vi) L p(w) L p(u j) L d2;
• p(vi) L d1 L p(w) L p(u j) L d2.
As R = 129 |C| + 464 |D|, it follows that for every
(
ui, v j, uk
)
∈ C, either ui L′ v j L′ uk or uk L′ v j L′ ui holds.
Moreover, for every
(
vi,w, u j
)
∈ D, we have either vi L′ w L′ u j or u j L′ w L′ vi. This implies that L′ is a solution of
I.
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Appendix
The following figures and tables are utilized in the proof of Theorem 7. In all tables shown below, ({a, b}, c, d)
represents the lists (a, b, c, d) and (b, a, c, d).
p(ui) p(uk)
d1p(vj)
d1 p(vj)
p(uk)p(ui)
p(uk) d2
p(ui)p(vj)
p(ui) d2
p(uk)p(vj)
Figure 1: This figure shows the top favorite products and the preferences of the four buyers created for a (ui, v j, uk) ∈ C in the NP-hardness of the
SE-PA- f SC problem in Theorem 7. An arc from a product to another product means that the former one is preferred to the latter one.
p(vi) p(uj)
d1p(w)
1 :
d1 p(w)
p(uj)p(vi)
1 :
p(uj) d2
p(vi)p(w)
5 :
p(vi) d2
p(uj)p(w)
7 :
Figure 2: This figure shows the top favorite products and the preferences of the 14 buyers created for an (vi,w, u j, ) ∈ D in the NP-hardness of the
SE-PA- f SC problem in Theorem 7. The number on the left side of each graph is the number of buyers with the top circle and preferences as shown
in the graph on the right side. An arc from a product to another product means that the former one is preferred to the latter one.
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list results list results
({p(ui), p(uk)}, d1, p(v j)) p(v j), d1 ({p(uk), d1}, p(ui), p(v j)) p(v j), p(ui)
({p(ui), p(uk)}, p(v j), d1) d1, d1 ({p(uk), d1}, p(v j), p(ui)) p(v j), p(ui)
({p(ui), d1}, p(uk), p(v j)) p(v j), p(v j) ({p(uk), p(v j)}, p(ui), d1) d1, p(ui)
({p(ui), d1}, p(v j), p(uk)) p(v j), p(uk) ({p(uk), p(v j)}, d1, p(ui)) p(ui), p(ui)
({p(ui), p(v j)}, p(uk), d1) d1, d1 ({d1, p(v j)}, p(ui), p(uk)) p(ui), p(uk)
({p(ui), p(v j)}, d1, p(uk)) p(uk), p(uk) ({d1, p(v j)}, p(uk), p(ui)) p(ui), p(ui)
Table 2: This table summarizes all lists of products p(ui), p(v j), p(uk) and d1 chosen by the first two buyers corresponding to a 3-tuple (ui, v j, uk) ∈ C
(see the two graphs above in Figure 1 for the preferences of these two buyers). The results are the products that the two buyers will choose, one for
each.
list results list results
({p(uk), d2}, p(ui), p(v j)) p(v j), p(v j) ({d2, p(ui)}, p(uk), p(v j)) p(v j), p(v j)
({p(uk), d2}, p(v j), p(ui)) p(ui), p(v j) ({d2, p(ui)}, p(v j), p(uk)) p(v j), p(uk)
({p(uk), p(ui)}, d2, p(v j)) p(v j), p(v j) ({d2, p(v j)}, p(uk), p(ui)) p(ui), p(ui)
({p(uk), p(ui)}, p(v j), d2) p(v j), p(v j) ({d2, p(v j)}, p(ui), p(uk)) p(uk), p(uk)
({p(uk), p(v j)}, d2, p(ui)) p(ui), p(ui) ({p(ui), p(v j)}, p(uk), d2) p(uk), d2
({p(uk), p(v j)}, p(ui), d2) d2, p(ui) ({p(ui), p(v j)}, d2, p(uk)) p(uk), p(uk)
Table 3: This table summarizes all lists of products p(ui), p(v j), p(uk) and d2 chosen by the last two buyers corresponding to a 3-tuple (ui, v j, uk) ∈ C
(see the two graphs below in Figure 1 for the preferences of these two buyers). The results are the products that the two buyers will choose, one for
each.
list results list results
({p(vi), p(u j)}, d1, p(w)) p(w), d1 ({p(u j), d1}, p(vi), p(w)) p(w), p(vi)
({p(vi), p(u j)}, p(w), d1) d1, d1 ({p(u j), d1}, p(w), p(vi)) p(w), p(vi)
({p(vi), d1}, p(u j), p(w)) p(w), p(w) ({p(u j), p(w)}, p(vi), d1) d1, p(vi)
({p(vi), d1}, p(w), p(u j)) p(w), p(u j) ({p(u j), p(w)}, d1, p(vi)) p(vi), p(vi)
({p(vi), p(w)}, p(u j), d1) d1, d1 ({d1, p(w)}, p(vi), p(u j)) p(vi), p(u j)
({p(vi), p(w)}, d1, p(u j)) p(u j), p(u j) ({d1, p(w)}, p(u j), p(vi)) p(vi), p(vi)
Table 4: This table summarizes all lists of products p(vi), p(u j), p(w) and d1 chosen by the first two buyers corresponding to a 3-tuple (vi,w, u j) ∈ D
(see the two graphs above in Figure 2 for the preferences of these two buyers). The results are the products that the two buyers will choose.
list results list results
({p(u j), d2}, p(vi), p(w)) p(w), p(w) ({d2, p(vi)}, p(u j), p(w)) p(w), p(w)
({p(u j), d2}, p(w), p(vi)) p(vi), p(w) ({d2, p(vi)}, p(w), p(u j)) p(w), p(u j)
({p(u j), p(vi)}, d2, p(w)) p(w), p(w) ({d2, p(w)}, p(u j), p(vi)) p(vi), p(vi)
({p(u j), p(vi)}, p(w), d2) p(w), p(w) ({d2, p(w)}, p(vi), p(u j)) p(u j), p(u j)
({p(u j), p(w)}, d2, p(vi)) p(vi), p(vi) ({p(vi), p(w)}, p(u j), d2) p(u j), d2
({p(u j), p(w)}, p(vi), d2) d2, p(vi) ({p(vi), p(w)}, d2, p(u j)) p(u j), p(u j)
Table 5: This table summarizes all lists of products p(vi), p(u j), p(w) and d2 chosen by the last 5+7=12 buyers corresponding to a 3-tuple (vi,w, u j) ∈
D (see the two graphs below in Figure 2 for the preferences of these 12 buyers). The results p, p′ shown in the table means that first 5 buyers
choose p and the last 7 buyers choose p′. So, for a list with results p, p′, the total profits of the products chosen by the 12 buyers is 5µ(p) + 7µ(p′).
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